chore: ARTEX 初始化
ARTEX — AI 自主渗透测试系统（Go 后端 + Next.js 前端，单二进制内嵌）。 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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// Package guard implements the safety boundary layer (docs §11): side-effect
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// gating of destructive/exfil shell commands, an audit log, and Observer/G5
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// failure attribution. Every tool call passes through the PreToolUse hook before
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// executing. (The RoE authorization-scope mechanism was removed; a replacement
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// may be added later.)
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package guard
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"regexp"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"github.com/Autumn-27/norma/hook"
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"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/intercept"
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)
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// AuditEntry records one gated tool call.
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type AuditEntry struct {
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TS int64 `json:"ts"`
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Tool string `json:"tool"`
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Action string `json:"action"` // allow|block
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Reason string `json:"reason,omitempty"`
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Command string `json:"command,omitempty"`
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}
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// Guard enforces the side-effect policy via agent-core hooks.
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type Guard struct {
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mu sync.Mutex
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audit []AuditEntry
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attrib map[string]int // failure attribution counts (Observer / G5)
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reg *hook.Registry
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interceptor *intercept.Interceptor // optional; nil disables user-configured rules
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}
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// New creates a Guard without user-configured intercept rules (used for pentest
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// tasks where the Interceptor is not yet available).
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func New() *Guard { return newGuard(nil) }
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// NewWithInterceptor creates a Guard with user-configured intercept rules.
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func NewWithInterceptor(ic *intercept.Interceptor) *Guard { return newGuard(ic) }
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func newGuard(ic *intercept.Interceptor) *Guard {
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g := &Guard{attrib: map[string]int{}, interceptor: ic}
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g.reg = hook.NewRegistry().
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On(hook.PreToolUse, g.preToolUse).
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On(hook.PostToolUse, g.postToolUse)
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return g
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}
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// Hooks returns the hook registry to attach to an agent session.
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func (g *Guard) Hooks() *hook.Registry { return g.reg }
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var (
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reDestructive = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\b(rm\s+-rf\s+/|mkfs|dd\s+if=|:\(\)\s*\{|shutdown|reboot|>\s*/dev/sd)`)
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reExfil = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(curl|wget|nc|ncat)\b[^|]*\b(\|\s*(curl|wget|nc))`)
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)
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func (g *Guard) preToolUse(ctx context.Context, ev hook.Event) hook.Result {
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// Gate the shell-command surface: Bash + the interactive-shell tools (shell_open's
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// command, shell_send's text). Same destructive/exfil rules — an interactive
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// session must not bypass the safety boundary. Other tools pass through.
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var cmd string
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switch ev.ToolName {
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case "Bash", "shell_open":
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var in struct {
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Command string `json:"command"`
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}
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_ = json.Unmarshal(ev.Input, &in)
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cmd = in.Command
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case "shell_send":
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var in struct {
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Text string `json:"text"`
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}
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_ = json.Unmarshal(ev.Input, &in)
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cmd = in.Text
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default:
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g.record(ev.ToolName, "allow", "", "")
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return g.applyIntercept(ctx, ev)
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}
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if strings.TrimSpace(cmd) == "" { // e.g. shell_send with only keys/hex → nothing to check
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g.record(ev.ToolName, "allow", "", "")
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return g.applyIntercept(ctx, ev)
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}
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// destructive / exfil gating (§11 side-effect gating)
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if reDestructive.MatchString(cmd) {
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return g.block(ev.ToolName, "破坏性命令被安全边界拒绝（需人工批准）", cmd)
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}
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if reExfil.MatchString(cmd) {
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return g.block(ev.ToolName, "疑似数据外泄管道被拒绝", cmd)
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}
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g.record(ev.ToolName, "allow", "", cmd)
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return g.applyIntercept(ctx, ev)
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}
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// applyIntercept evaluates user-configured intercept rules against the tool call.
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// It is called after all built-in safety checks pass.
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func (g *Guard) applyIntercept(ctx context.Context, ev hook.Event) hook.Result {
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if g.interceptor == nil {
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return hook.Result{}
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}
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if !g.interceptor.IsToolEnabled(ev.ToolName) {
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return hook.Result{}
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}
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dec, matched := g.interceptor.Match(ev.ToolName, ev.Input)
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if !matched {
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return hook.Result{}
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}
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switch dec.Action {
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case "deny":
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return g.block(ev.ToolName, dec.Message, "")
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case "allow":
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return hook.Result{}
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case "ask":
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// If the worker context is already cancelled (task stopped / killed), block
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// immediately without creating a pending record — avoids orphaned DB entries
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// and makes execOne complete fast, reducing the race against drainSynthetic.
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if ctx.Err() != nil {
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return g.block(ev.ToolName, "工作已取消，拦截规则阻止执行", "")
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}
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convID := intercept.ConvIDFromContext(ctx)
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if !g.interceptor.HandleAsk(ctx, convID, dec, ev.ToolName, ev.Input) {
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return g.block(ev.ToolName, "用户拒绝或审批超时", "")
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}
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return hook.Result{}
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}
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return hook.Result{}
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}
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var reBlocked = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\b(403|forbidden|waf|blocked|rate.?limit|429|captcha|denied)\b`)
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// postToolUse is the Observer failure-attribution hook (G5): it classifies tool
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// results into blocked / error / ok so the planner can change strategy instead
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// of giving up at a WAF.
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func (g *Guard) postToolUse(_ context.Context, ev hook.Event) hook.Result {
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if ev.ToolName != "Bash" {
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return hook.Result{}
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}
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class := "ok"
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switch {
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case reBlocked.Match(ev.Result):
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class = "blocked"
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case ev.IsError:
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class = "error"
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}
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g.mu.Lock()
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g.attrib[class]++
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g.mu.Unlock()
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return hook.Result{}
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}
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// Attributions returns failure-attribution counts (Observer / G5).
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func (g *Guard) Attributions() map[string]int {
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g.mu.Lock()
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defer g.mu.Unlock()
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out := make(map[string]int, len(g.attrib))
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for k, v := range g.attrib {
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out[k] = v
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}
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return out
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}
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func (g *Guard) block(tool, reason, cmd string) hook.Result {
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g.record(tool, "block", reason, cmd)
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return hook.Result{Decision: "block", Message: reason}
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}
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func (g *Guard) record(tool, action, reason, cmd string) {
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g.mu.Lock()
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defer g.mu.Unlock()
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g.audit = append(g.audit, AuditEntry{TS: time.Now().Unix(), Tool: tool, Action: action, Reason: reason, Command: cmd})
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if len(g.audit) > 2000 {
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g.audit = g.audit[len(g.audit)-2000:]
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}
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}
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// Audit returns a snapshot of recent gated calls (most recent last).
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func (g *Guard) Audit() []AuditEntry {
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g.mu.Lock()
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defer g.mu.Unlock()
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out := make([]AuditEntry, len(g.audit))
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copy(out, g.audit)
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return out
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}
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