Files
ARTEX-chixuweihu/server/repeater.go
T

410 lines
12 KiB
Go
Raw Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters
This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.
package server
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"syscall"
"time"
)
const (
repeaterMaxBody = 2 << 20 // 2 MiB, for both the JSON request and response preview
repeaterDefaultTimeout = 30_000
repeaterMinTimeout = 1_000
repeaterMaxTimeout = 120_000
repeaterAllowLocalEnv = "ARTEX_REPEATER_ALLOW_LOCAL"
)
var repeaterHopByHop = map[string]struct{}{
"Connection": {}, "Keep-Alive": {}, "Proxy-Connection": {}, "Transfer-Encoding": {},
"Te": {}, "Trailer": {}, "Upgrade": {}, "Content-Length": {}, "Proxy-Authorization": {},
}
type repeaterSendRequest struct {
Method *string `json:"method"`
URL string `json:"url"`
Headers map[string]string `json:"headers"`
Body string `json:"body"`
TimeoutMs int `json:"timeout_ms"`
InsecureSkipVerify bool `json:"insecure_skip_verify"`
UseRecordingProxy *bool `json:"use_recording_proxy"`
}
type repeaterSendResponse struct {
Status int `json:"status"`
StatusText string `json:"status_text"`
Proto string `json:"proto"`
Headers map[string][]string `json:"headers"`
Body string `json:"body"`
BodyTruncated bool `json:"body_truncated"`
BodyBytes int `json:"body_bytes"`
ElapsedMs int64 `json:"elapsed_ms"`
URL string `json:"url"`
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
}
func (s *Server) registerRepeater(mux *http.ServeMux) {
mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/repeater/send", s.sendRepeater)
}
func (s *Server) sendRepeater(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var in repeaterSendRequest
dec := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, repeaterMaxBody))
if err := dec.Decode(&in); err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "请求体无效")
return
}
// Reject a second JSON value (or oversized trailing data) instead of silently
// accepting bytes beyond the documented 2 MiB request limit.
var extra any
if err := dec.Decode(&extra); err != io.EOF {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "请求体无效")
return
}
method := http.MethodGet
if in.Method != nil {
method = strings.ToUpper(strings.TrimSpace(*in.Method))
}
if method == "" {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "HTTP 方法不能为空")
return
}
switch method {
case http.MethodGet, http.MethodPost, http.MethodPut, http.MethodPatch,
http.MethodDelete, http.MethodHead, http.MethodOptions:
default:
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "不支持的 HTTP 方法")
return
}
rawURL := strings.TrimSpace(in.URL)
if rawURL == "" {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "url 必填")
return
}
u, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
if err != nil || u.Host == "" || u.Hostname() == "" ||
!strings.EqualFold(u.Scheme, "http") && !strings.EqualFold(u.Scheme, "https") {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "仅支持绝对 http/https URL")
return
}
// This check is needed even when a proxy is used: the proxy must remain usable
// for normal targets, while obvious literal metadata/loopback URLs stay blocked.
if err := repeaterCheckURL(u); err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
return
}
timeoutMs := in.TimeoutMs
if timeoutMs <= 0 {
timeoutMs = repeaterDefaultTimeout
}
if timeoutMs < repeaterMinTimeout {
timeoutMs = repeaterMinTimeout
}
if timeoutMs > repeaterMaxTimeout {
timeoutMs = repeaterMaxTimeout
}
useRecordingProxy := true
if in.UseRecordingProxy != nil {
useRecordingProxy = *in.UseRecordingProxy
}
var body io.Reader
if in.Body != "" && method != http.MethodHead {
body = strings.NewReader(in.Body)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), time.Duration(timeoutMs)*time.Millisecond)
defer cancel()
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, u.String(), body)
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "构造请求失败")
return
}
for key, value := range in.Headers {
name := strings.TrimSpace(key)
if name == "" {
continue
}
if _, blocked := repeaterHopByHop[http.CanonicalHeaderKey(name)]; blocked {
continue
}
if strings.EqualFold(name, "Host") {
// Host is a special Request field, but retaining it in Header too makes
// the editor semantics explicit; net/http uses req.Host on the wire.
req.Host = strings.TrimSpace(value)
req.Header.Set("Host", strings.TrimSpace(value))
continue
}
req.Header.Set(name, value)
}
client := &http.Client{
Timeout: time.Duration(timeoutMs) * time.Millisecond,
Transport: s.repeaterTransport(useRecordingProxy, in.InsecureSkipVerify),
CheckRedirect: func(next *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= 10 {
return errors.New("重定向次数过多")
}
if err := repeaterCheckURL(next.URL); err != nil {
return err
}
if len(via) > 0 && !strings.EqualFold(next.URL.Host, via[0].URL.Host) {
return fmt.Errorf("拒绝跨主机重定向(%s → %s)", via[0].URL.Host, next.URL.Host)
}
return nil
},
}
started := time.Now()
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, repeaterSendResponse{
Headers: map[string][]string{}, URL: u.String(),
ElapsedMs: time.Since(started).Milliseconds(), Error: repeaterRedactError(err),
})
return
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
out := repeaterSendResponse{
Status: resp.StatusCode, StatusText: resp.Status, Proto: resp.Proto,
Headers: resp.Header.Clone(), URL: resp.Request.URL.String(),
}
if method != http.MethodHead {
// Read one byte beyond the cap so truncation is exact. The MVP keeps the
// preview as UTF-8 text; invalid bytes are replaced instead of base64.
data, readErr := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, repeaterMaxBody+1))
if len(data) > repeaterMaxBody {
out.BodyTruncated = true
data = data[:repeaterMaxBody]
}
out.Body = repeaterBodyText(data)
out.BodyBytes = len(data)
if readErr != nil && !errors.Is(readErr, io.EOF) {
out.Error = "读取响应失败: " + readErr.Error()
}
}
out.ElapsedMs = time.Since(started).Milliseconds()
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, out)
}
// repeaterBodyText keeps the response preview as text for the MVP. Invalid
// UTF-8 and NUL bytes are replaced so a binary response cannot inject control
// characters into the JSON/UI raw view; the original bytes are not base64
// encoded and the preview remains bounded by repeaterMaxBody.
func repeaterBodyText(data []byte) string {
text := string(bytes.ToValidUTF8(data, []byte("�")))
return strings.ReplaceAll(text, "\x00", "�")
}
func (s *Server) repeaterTransport(useRecordingProxy, insecure bool) http.RoundTripper {
var transport *http.Transport
proxied := false
if useRecordingProxy && s != nil && s.m != nil {
transport = s.httpProxyTransport(httpExec{UseRecordingProxy: true})
proxied = transport != nil
}
if transport == nil && s != nil && s.m != nil && strings.TrimSpace(s.m.GlobalProxy()) != "" {
transport = s.httpProxyTransport(httpExec{Proxy: s.m.GlobalProxy()})
proxied = transport != nil
}
if transport == nil {
if base, ok := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport); ok {
transport = base.Clone()
} else {
transport = &http.Transport{}
}
// "Direct" means direct even if the process inherited HTTP_PROXY. The
// configured recording/global proxy paths are handled above explicitly.
transport.Proxy = nil
}
transport = transport.Clone()
// Keep response bytes faithful and make body_bytes match what was received;
// transparent gzip decompression would otherwise obscure both values.
transport.DisableCompression = true
if !proxied {
// Clear a custom TLS dialer before installing the guarded dialer; when
// DialTLSContext is set, net/http bypasses DialContext entirely.
transport.DialTLSContext = nil
transport.DialTLS = nil
transport.Dial = nil
transport.DialContext = (&net.Dialer{
Timeout: 15 * time.Second, KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second,
Control: repeaterBlockSensitiveDial,
}).DialContext
}
if insecure {
cfg := &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true} //nolint:gosec // explicit user option for pentest targets
if transport.TLSClientConfig != nil {
cfg = transport.TLSClientConfig.Clone()
cfg.InsecureSkipVerify = true
}
transport.TLSClientConfig = cfg
}
return transport
}
func repeaterAllowLocal() bool {
v := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(repeaterAllowLocalEnv))
return v == "1" || strings.EqualFold(v, "true")
}
func repeaterCheckURL(u *url.URL) error {
if repeaterAllowLocal() {
return nil
}
host := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimSpace(u.Hostname()), ".")
// URL.Hostname may retain an IPv6 zone (for example fe80::1%eth0); the
// zone is not part of the address classification.
if zone := strings.IndexByte(host, '%'); zone >= 0 {
host = host[:zone]
}
ip := net.ParseIP(host)
if ip == nil && repeaterLooksNumericHost(host) {
var ok bool
ip, ok = repeaterParseLegacyIPv4(host)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("拒绝无法解析的数字主机地址 %q", host)
}
}
if strings.EqualFold(host, "localhost") || (ip != nil && repeaterIsBlockedDialIP(ip)) {
return fmt.Errorf("拒绝访问本机/链路本地地址(如确需访问本机服务,设置 %s=1)", repeaterAllowLocalEnv)
}
return nil
}
// repeaterLooksNumericHost identifies the legacy numeric spellings accepted by
// common proxy/resolver implementations (decimal, octal, hexadecimal and
// dotted inet_aton forms). A numeric-looking value that fails to parse is
// rejected instead of being handed to a proxy for its own interpretation.
func repeaterLooksNumericHost(host string) bool {
if host == "" || host[0] < '0' || host[0] > '9' {
return false
}
for i := 0; i < len(host); i++ {
c := host[i]
switch {
case c == '.':
case c >= '0' && c <= '9':
case c >= 'a' && c <= 'f', c >= 'A' && c <= 'F':
case c == 'x' || c == 'X':
default:
return false
}
}
return true
}
// repeaterParseLegacyIPv4 follows inet_aton's 1-, 2-, 3- and 4-part IPv4
// notation. Parts with a leading zero are octal and parts with 0x are hex.
func repeaterParseLegacyIPv4(host string) (net.IP, bool) {
parts := strings.Split(host, ".")
if len(parts) < 1 || len(parts) > 4 {
return nil, false
}
values := make([]uint64, len(parts))
for i, part := range parts {
if part == "" {
return nil, false
}
base := 10
digits := part
if len(digits) > 2 && digits[0] == '0' && (digits[1] == 'x' || digits[1] == 'X') {
base, digits = 16, digits[2:]
} else if len(digits) > 1 && digits[0] == '0' {
base = 8
}
if digits == "" {
return nil, false
}
value, err := strconv.ParseUint(digits, base, 32)
if err != nil {
return nil, false
}
values[i] = value
}
var value uint64
switch len(values) {
case 1:
value = values[0]
case 2:
if values[0] > 0xff || values[1] > 0xffffff {
return nil, false
}
value = values[0]<<24 | values[1]
case 3:
if values[0] > 0xff || values[1] > 0xff || values[2] > 0xffff {
return nil, false
}
value = values[0]<<24 | values[1]<<16 | values[2]
case 4:
for _, part := range values {
if part > 0xff {
return nil, false
}
}
value = values[0]<<24 | values[1]<<16 | values[2]<<8 | values[3]
}
if value > 0xffffffff {
return nil, false
}
return net.IPv4(byte(value>>24), byte(value>>16), byte(value>>8), byte(value)), true
}
func repeaterIsBlockedDialIP(ip net.IP) bool {
if ip == nil {
return true
}
if v4 := ip.To4(); v4 != nil {
ip = v4
}
return ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() ||
ip.IsInterfaceLocalMulticast() || ip.IsUnspecified() || ip.IsMulticast()
}
func repeaterBlockSensitiveDial(_, address string, _ syscall.RawConn) error {
if repeaterAllowLocal() {
return nil
}
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(address)
if err != nil {
return err
}
ip := net.ParseIP(host)
if ip == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("无法解析目标地址 %q", host)
}
if repeaterIsBlockedDialIP(ip) {
return fmt.Errorf("拒绝访问本机/链路本地地址 %s(如确需访问本机服务,设置 %s=1)", ip, repeaterAllowLocalEnv)
}
return nil
}
func repeaterRedactError(err error) string {
var urlErr *url.Error
if errors.As(err, &urlErr) {
host := ""
if parsed, parseErr := url.Parse(urlErr.URL); parseErr == nil {
host = parsed.Host
}
if urlErr.Err != nil {
return fmt.Sprintf("%s %s: %s", urlErr.Op, host, urlErr.Err)
}
return fmt.Sprintf("%s %s: 未知错误", urlErr.Op, host)
}
return err.Error()
}